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America as an indiscriminate agent of intervention all over the globe. I myself find it difficult to believe that the value of such intensive and systematic intelligence offsets the increase in ill will which is its inevitable result. It seems to be clear that contemporary world politics obliges some sort of system of intelligence from the great powers. I am prepared to accept the argument that such a system, properly controlled and executed, can often be an agent of necessary international stability. I am less convinced of the need for extensive operations in countries, mainly those of the "third world," where American interests and American competition are not so clearly at stake.

If those responsible for the conduct of American diplomacy judge that intelligence is a crucial mechanism for security, and if they can exercise restraint and sensitivity to the intense political and psychological implications of this activity, then the case for intelligence operations can be made with reason and effect. It is intolerable, however, that intelligence activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and other organizations be free from rigorous democratic review. And this is clearly the case now.

Since the outset of the cold war, and the growth of the intelligence community, individual public servants and special expert commissions have urged the establishment of a Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence Operations. The Hoover Commission, for example, put the case strongly over 10 years ago. The report stated:

The task force is concerned over the absence of satisfactory machinery for surveillance of the stewardship of the CIA. It is making recommendations which it believes will provide the proper type of watchdog commission as a means of reestablishing that relationship between the CIA and the Congress so essential and characteristic of our democratic form of government, but which was abrogated by the enactment of Public Law 110 and other statutes relating to the Agency. It would include Representatives of both Houses of Congress and of the Chief Executive. Its duties would embrace a review of the operations and effectiveness, not only of the CIA, but also of all other intelligence agencies.

The report continued:

Although the task force has discovered no indication of abuses of powers by the CIA or other intelligence agencies, it nevertheless is firmly convinced, as a matter of future insurance, that some reliable, systematic review of all the agencies and their operations should be provided by congressional action as a checkrein to assure both the Congress and the people that this hub of the intelligence effort is functioning in an efficient, effective, and reasonably economical manner.

From time to time, special study commissions have been assigned to overlook the general structure of the intelligence community. Thus, after the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy established machinery for extensive review of the CIA. Temporary oversight, however, is not the answer, particularly when it is forced to operate in an atmosphere of disquiet and recent crisis. What is needed is deliber-

ous review of our intelligence activities. In short, a congressional committee.

No one need be reminded of the significance of intelligence in foreign affairs. Nor should it be necessary to remind ourselves that the oversight of administration and executive operations is a crucial function of the legislative branch. These two points, supplemented by extensive evidence of disorder in the intelligence community, provide an air-tight argument for the establishment of a Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence Operations.

I am today submitting legislation designed to meet such a goal. Congress long ago recognized the peculiar importance of atomic energy policy, and therefore established the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which has been remarkably effective and vigilant. The Joint Committee on Intelligence Operations should be patterned after this success. It would be composed of seven Members of the House of Representatives and seven Members of the Senate, selected by the Speaker of the House and by the President of the Senate on a bipartisan basis. The committee would be instructed to initiate continuing studies and review of intelligence activities, and would require the CIA and similar organizations to keep it currently and adequately apprised of American policy and operations.

The case for such action is unimpeachable. Past events have dramatized the admissibility of oversight. Democratic theory and practice oblige it. The performances of congressional Committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services are evidence of legislative responsibility in the national security sphere. A Joint Committee on Intelligence Operations should be established forthwith.

#### AUTHORITY OVER INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

(Mr. ROSENTHAL (at the request of Mr. SMITH of Iowa) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Speaker, recent revelations from Singapore and Washington dramatize once more the total inadequacy of executive and congressional authority over intelligence operations.

For at least 10 years, it has been clear that the distinction between the gathering of raw information and the implementation of actual policy is a tenuous one. An intelligence agent assigned to a mission with considerable resources and influence cannot help but make moves carrying high political significance. It is the very nature of such operations that information and policy become almost indistinguishable. It is likewise clear that intelligence operations can sometimes tend to reinforce the